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FINANCING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM:
CAN INSURERS COPE?
Nicos A. SCORDIS*
What I want to do in this presentation is to look at the
interrelationships that exist in the insurance industry among
different coverages, and how terrorism by itself impacts these
interrelationships.
The insurance industry is a global industry. Just look at the
number of property and casualty insurance companies that
operate in the United States. We have about twelve hundred
insurance companies.1 If you follow the ownership structure then
we are down to about three hundred stock insurance companies. 2
If we look at the ultimate control of those insurance companies
we find larger insurance companies owning or controlling state
and smaller insurance companies. 3 We see that unregistered
foundations sometimes own stakes in U.S. insurance companies. 4
And we see the controlling companies to be global in scope. For
example, the American International Group, one of the largest
U.S. insurers began life outside the United States, so it should be
* Dr. Scordis is an Associate Professor at the Tobin College of Business St. John's
University where he holds the John R. Cox/ACE Limited Chair of Risk and Insurance.
His has written for academic journal and professional publications. He has given expert
testimony at U.S. Congress hearings relating to financial services legislation. He teaches
and researches topics relating to risk financing. These remarks are an actual transcript of
the author's comments at the St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary Symposium on
Mar. 14, 2003.
1 See generally George L. Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of
Insurance, 63 TUL. L. REV. 999, 1003-04 (1989) (providing the number of insurers offering
liability insurance).
2 See generally id. at 1002-14 (discussing the overall structure of the commercial
casualty industry).
3 See generally Tom Ablum & Mary Beth Burgis, Leveraged Buyouts: The Ever
Changing Landscape, 13 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 109, 111 (Fall 2000/Spring 2001) (showing
that small insurance companies are bought out).
4 See generally Danielle F. Waterfield, Insurers Jump on Train for Federal Insurance
Regulation: Is It Really What They Want or Need?, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 283, 286-90
(2002/2003) (promulgating the early regulatory history of the insurance industry,
including the development of the registration requirement).
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no surprise that according to the year 2001 10-K statement, 29%
of AIG's assets support business outside the U.S. So whether we
are talking about a response to terrorism or about the financial
strength of the industry, we need to keep in mind the global
perspective. There are some advantages, and disadvantages of
the global perspective.
If we look at the insurance industry in the global context then
we can conclude that the insurance industry is not unfamiliar to
huge manmade catastrophes, and natural catastrophes. 5
However, what is important to discuss is our situation here in
the U.S. A study that was first released in 1999 concluded that
U.S. insurers can pay at least 92.8% of a hundred billion property
loss in the U.S.6 At least 92.8% because it depends whether
insurance companies in the interlocking relationships mentioned
earlier allow weekly capitalized subsidiaries to fail, or whether
insurance companies are going to transfer funds down the
ownership chain to support financially distressed subsidiaries. 7
The scenario the study uses says we can cover almost a hundred
billion dollars in loss. But the study does not consider the fate of
small regional, independent insurance companies. In fact, the
study expects that smaller companies are going to find
themselves in a situation of financial distress. Then the question
becomes, whether as a matter of public policy, it is permissible to
allow insurance companies to go bankrupt, thus forcing the
surviving insurers to shoulder part of the outstanding claims
under the State guarantee fund system. After all we live in a
society that bankruptcy can be used as a corporate tool for
ultimately managing risk.8 So the question is whether society
5 See How Modeling Can Ensure Survival in Age of the Super-Cat, INS. DAY, Mar. 26,
2002, Special Report (acknowledging that large natural catastrophes occur every few
years and man-made catastrophes also occur every year or two).
6 See David J. Cummins et al., Can Insurers Pay for the 'Big One'? Measuring the
Capacity of the Insurance Market to Respond to Catastrophic Losses, 26, JOURNAL OF
BANKING AND FINANCE, 557 (2002) (showing that if insurers hold a net of reinsurance
book of business that is correlated with aggregate industry losses, the industry can
adequately fund a$100 billion loss event).
7 See generally Homeowners Insurance Availability Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R.
21Before the House Banking and Financial Services Committee, 106th Cong. (statement
of Franklin W. Nutter, President, Reinsurance Association of America), available at
http://financialservices.house.govfbanking/73099nut.htm (July 30, 1999) (commenting
that' gaps in catastrophic risk financing are not sufficient to justify federal intervention in
private markets).
8 See Adam Hodkin, Note, Insurer Insolvency: Problems & Solutions, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 727, 728-31 (1992) (arguing that one reason why domestic insurance companies are
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will take responsibility for potentially insolvent insurers before
or after a loss occurs.
Let us examine where the pressures on the financial solvency
of U.S. insurance companies stem from. The combined ratio is
one place to look.9 It is an industry benchmark that looks at the
expenses and the losses in relation to the premiums the
insurance industry receives.1 0 If we have a combined ratio of a
hundred, it means one dollar of premium goes out to pay one
dollar of losses and expenses. If we have a combined ratio of 107,
as we did at the end of 1999, it means that the insurance
company receives 100 dollars in premium, but it pays out 107
dollars in losses and expenses.
So we have pressure on the underwriting profitability of
insurance companies, not from terrorists, but from the actions
that insurance companies have taken in the past. The people in
the academy that study this, they call it risk overhang." There
are decisions that the industry has taken in the past which are
putting stress on its free funds, its surplus. Without additional
stress the ability of the insurance industry to meet its
policyholder obligations would not have merited such national
attention. But now we have additional stress. By the end of 2001
this combined ratio stood at 116.
We might wonder how does the insurance industry make a
profit if it is paying 107 cents for every dollar it gets in
premiums? To answer the question we have to look at
investment income. The operating profit of the insurance
industry is one hundred minus the combined ratio minus the
investment income. 12 So if the insurance industry is making a
excluded from the Federal Bankruptcy Code and thus under state solvency regulation is
because states have an interest in protecting public interest since the public is generally
at an economic disadvantage as compared to insurance companies).
9 See Question Time: Rationalizing Insurance Ratios, INVESTORS CHRON., May 4,
2001, at 94 (explaining that a combined ratio below 100% is indicative of profitable
insurance underwriting business as opposed to unprofitable underwriting which yields
combined ratios greater than 100%).
10 See generally Richard N. Clarke et al., Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis: Sources
of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367, 372
(1988) (giving examples of the combined loss / expense to premium ratio).
11 See Anne Gron & Alan 0. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the
Government as Insurer?, 36 IND. L. REV. 447, 454 (2003) (noting that insurers may
rebalance their exposure to risk by not renewing existing expired policies or canceling
existing policies when contractually possible).
12 See generally Eliot Martin Blake, Comment, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the
Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 423
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positive return on its investments, that return is going to offset
the underwriting losses.13
Even though in 1999, the insurance industry had a combined
ratio of about one hundred, the inclusion of investment incomes
in 1999 resulted in a positive operating return for the insurance
industry, but by 2001 the result was minus nineteen percent
operating profit.14 This shows a problem for the industry, even
though some individual firms have performed remarkably well.
How is the insurance industry going to move over this
problem? How are we, the policyholders, going to move through
the problem? You hear industry bosses say that they will draw
on their surplus. But, that pool of surplus capital has been
coming down over time. According to the Standard & Poors
analysis, the insurance industry in 1998 had over three hundred
percent of the capital that S&P wanted to see for an insurance
company to maintain its S&P rating.15 In 1999 that capital
declined down to 250%16 and in 2001 the capital that S&P wants
to see in order to maintain the financial strength rating of an
insurance company, fell lower than 200%.17 But still, according to
the S&P study the insurance industry has about $289 billion of
capital that supports about $324 billion of premium.i8 This is a
ratio of one to 1.12.19 The rule of thumb or benchmark in the
(1988) (discussing how insurers can exclude certain realized and unrealized capital gains
from operating profit).
13 See id. at 423-24 (noting that gainful investment income allows insurance
companies to remain profitable despite significant negative underwriting losses).
14 See generally Meg Green, Divide and Conquer: American International Group
Touts Its Strength in Diversity, BEST'S REV., July 1, 2003, at 24 (asserting that A.I.G. "has
significantly outperformed its peers by posting both a five-year average combined ratio of
under 100 and a pretax operating profit on equity of 15%").
15 See generally $189 Billion in Capital Could be Returned to Stakeholders, INS. DAY,
Dec. 7, 2000, at 1 (suggesting that insurers performing poorly should maintain extra
capital to prevent a ratings downgrade).
16 See Standard & Poor's, Property/Casualty Insurance Ratings Criteria,' at 75 tbl. 1
(1999) available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spflpdf/fixedincome/propcas.pdf
(last visited Nov. 12, 2003) (indicating the capital requirements for insurance companies
in 1999).
17 See id. at 75 tbl. 1, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.comspf/pdffixedinc
ome/propcas.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2003) (anticipating the capital requirements for
insurance companies in 2001).
18 See American Academy of Actuaries, Terrorism Insurance Coverage in the
Aftermath of September li,, at 5 (May 2002) available at http://www.actuary.org/pdf/casu
alty/terrorism-may02.pdf (detailing the amounts of capital and premiums in the
insurance industry).
19 See id. at 5 (indicating the ratio of premium to capital in the insurance industry).
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industry is a ratio of one to two.20 So it can be argued that there
is still capacity in the U.S. insurance industry.
Now let us consider the issue of whether the shock that
September 1 1 th brought to the insurance system is unique. I
have argued that there is underwriting capacity, but September
1 1 th is something we have never seen before. Could that shock
have eroded the insurance industry's underwriting capacity?
Two studies have already answered this question. The one
study was presented at the National Bureau of Economic
Research in January 2003.21 The other was presented at the
Financial Management Association in October 2003.22 The
studies looked at the response of the capital markets to
Hurricane Andrew, which totaled $20.2 billion in losses adjusted
for 2001 dollars.23 Then the studies examined the Northridge
earthquake, which totaled $16.7 billion in property losses.24
Finally, the studies examined the capital markets' response to
the World Trade Center attack, which caused $19 billion in
property losses.25 These studies focused on the reaction of the
analysts that follow the stock of insurance companies, the
earnings' forecasts that insurance companies have released to
those analysts, and the movement of the stock price of the
insurance company. 26 All these events followed similar patterns.
20 See Standard & Poor's, supra note 16, at 75 tbl. 1 available at http://www2.standar
dandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/propcas.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2003) (predicting the
industry benchmark for 2003).
21 See Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance, at http://www.nber.o
rg/papers/w9271 '(Oct. 2002) (positing that September llth losses have depleted
insurance capacity).
22 See David Nickerson & Robert Van Order, Reinsurance, Crises, and Contagion
Effects in Regional Property-Liability Insurance Markets (Oct. 9, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with The Financial Management Association), at http://207.36.165.114
JDenver/Papers/DenverProgram8l8.htm#074 (last visited Oct. 25, 2003) (indicating that
September I1th losses were the greatest yet incurred by the insurance industry).
23 See Aurekia Zanetti et al., Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters in
2001: Man-Made Losses Take on a New Dimension, SIGMA REP. No. 1, at 13 n.11
available at http://www.swissre.com/INTERNET/pwsfilpr.nsf/vwFilebyIDKEYLu/SHOR-
586KCU/$FILE/sigmal_2002_e.pdf (2002) (detailing insurance losses stemming from
Hurricane Andrew).
24 See id. at 23 tbl. 9 (noting the losses suffered by the insurance industry as a result
of the Northridge earthquake).
25 See generally Lisa Anderson, NYC's 9/11 Bill Put at $83 Billion and Rising, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 5, 2002, at N10 (speaking of expected overall financial impact of World Trade
Center attack on N.Y.C.).
26 See generally Risk Management Solutions, Managing Risk in the Aftermath of the
World Trade Center Catastrophe, at http://www.rms.com/Publications/ManagingRiskafter
WTC-final.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2003) (suggesting when there is significant event
reaction may result in adverse impact on asset values of insurers' investment portfolios).
2004]
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The studies found that right after the shock happens there is a
drop in the stock price of the insurance companies and there is a
negative revision to the earnings forecasts of insurance
companies.27 Over the long-term, the earnings forecasts climb
back up again as the analysts realized that there was a
hardening in the market due to the catastrophe that took place. 2S
Society has taken steps to improve building codes in case of
natural catastrophe, and if there is a similar catastrophe, the
losses will be less than what they would have been without such
improvements. In the case of terrorists there is the potential of a
lot of losses, but as we have more losses we can then have more
events on which we can benchmark and have a response that is
effective to terrorists. The earnings forecasts go back up, and
within a week of the event, there is recovery in the stock price.29
What is different, however, between the World Trade Center
attack, Northridge and Andrew is that the negative reaction has
been larger with the World Trade Center attack. Indeed, a third
study focusing only on the Word Trade Center attack confirms
that the stock prices of insurance companies with strong
financial ratings rebounded after the first week after the attack
while the stock price of financially weak insurers did not. 30
There are lots of studies that price insurance using a financial
rather than an actuarial approach. These studies propose that
the premiums at the beginning of the year should be the
discounted value of the expected losses at the end of the year
where the discount rate is the risk-free rate. In this financial
pricing approach the profit of the insurance company is the
spread between the risk-free rate and the return on the invested
capital of the insurance company. But in our case, we have an
27 See Elizabeth Olson, World Business Briefing Europe: Switzerland: Insurer's Loss
Estimate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at W1 (exhibiting reduction in stock price and
reduction of earnings forecast of one company following World Trade Center attacks).
28 See Hardy Underwriting (HDU), INVESTORS CHRON., Dec. 6, 2002 (referring to
"hardening market" that results after large disasters which enable insurers to push
through big increases in premium rates, fuelling a boom for insurance industry).
29 See N.Y. State Senate Finance Committee Staff, Staff Analysis of the SFY 2002-03
Executive Budget, § 3: Issues in Focus, Financial Impact of the World Trade Center Attack
(Jan. 2002), at http://www.senate.state.ny.us ("Insurance company stock prices collapsed
in the week following the attack, but have since recovered as premiums began to rise
sharply, particularly for property and casualty lines.").
30 See David J. Cummins & Christopher Lewis, Catastrophic Events, Parameter
Uncertainty and the Breakdown of Implicit Long-term Contracting, 26 JOURNAL OF RISK
AND UNCERTAINTY 153 (2003) (Explaining how large loss events affect weakly capitalized
insurance companies more significantly than strongly capitalized companies).
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unexpected loss (the Word Trade Center attack), and a decline in
investment return for capital needing investment. So where is
the money going to come from? What can be the response of the
insurance industry? Well, insurance companies are constrained
by regulations as to where they invest their funds. Most of them
do a good job at maximizing their investment return given the
regulations so it is not likely that they will be able to generate a
higher return. So, the only other short-term solution is to make
adjustments in the coverages they offer for sale, or absorb the
extra losses using their cushion-providing capital. But we have
seen that capital being depleted already.
Insurance companies have chosen to adjust the terms of
coverage. We have seen premium rates up thirty to fifty percent
according to S&P studies, and the breadth of coverage has been
coming down.31 At the same time that insurance companies are
increasing premiums and reducing coverage, their bosses and
consumers are falling under the spell of negative sentiment. 32
This negative sentiment strengthens the belief that we are going
to have more losses, just as huge. We believe that we are in
danger of suffering huge losses, but we are uncertain as to their
timing and size. This uncertainty increases our negative
sentiment, and all this negative sentiment has impeded some
market-based solutions such as the issuance of catastrophe bonds
or the issuance of contingent financing and so on. 33
How to price terrorists is a small worry. I am not going to
enumerate all the models and all the talent that has been put
behind pricing terrorist risk. But I think our big worry is the
interrelationship between terrorists and the other risks that
insurance companies have managed to price and cover. These
risk interrelationships are creating larger than expected losses to
the insurance industry than just a terrorist related property loss.
31 See Ian Reed, Sept. 11 - The Last Straw for Global Reinsurance? Global Overview,
REACTIONS (U.K.), Sept. 1, 2002, at S1O (arguing that as September 11 caused increases
in premium rates it also enabled reinsurers to assert stricter terms and conditions in
policies).
32 See Fischhoff Baruch et al., Judged Terror Risk and Proximity to the World Trade
Centers, 26, JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY, 137 (2003) (finding that the closer a
person was to the World Trade Center the stronger their belief was that they would be a
victim of another attack. This finding was only prevalent among adult, white, Republican
males).
33 See generally 69-77 Paul Street, London EC2, INS. DAY, Oct. 17, 2001, at 9
(discussing the possible role that bonds may play in the aftermath of the events of
September 11, 2001).
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According to the Rand Foundation of Civil Justice, about two-
thirds of the claims filed against insurance companies from
asbestos liabilities are filed by manifestly healthy claimants, as
compared to the seventies when the litigation started with claims
filed by manifestly ill claimants. 34 Will the same pattern emerge
in filling for terrorism related losses?
Directors and officers liability is creating a lot of claims against
insurance companies. 35 In fact, it was in the news that AIG
recently boosted its loss reserves because of claims against
managers covered by AG.
We hear about workers compensation escalating costs. These
current costs will be small compared to the following scenario:
Suppose that an insurance company, through its different
subsidiaries, provided workers compensation to employees of a
company renting a building and to the owners of the building. A
terrorist attack destroys the building and injures the employees.
This will affect not only the property-casualty insurer but its life
subsidiary as well.
My message is that it is not terrorism itself that we need to
concern ourselves with, but rather how terrorism related losses
might exacerbate the "normal" losses that insurance companies
are already facing.
34 See Asbestos Quagmire; Small Businesses Now Targets of Often Unnecessary
Lawsuits That Could Kill Them Off, PIrrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 26, 2002, at C-12
(describing how majority of claims against asbestos manufacturers are by healthy people
who may have been exposed to asbestos and fear they will be barred by statute of
limitations if they wait until sick to sue).
35 See generally James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director
and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1207 (1988)
(explaining foundations behind directors and officers liability and how it can result in
claims against insurance companies).
